The government can regulate certain activities, but it must be sure, after following clear procedures, that the free speech protected under the First Amendment does not lose adequate strength.
The heart of due process in cases involving the First Amendment is the notion that we need a judicial determination, not administrative, to determine the nature of the questionable expression. Manual Enterprises v. Day 4 is the first case which states that under the First Amendment in itself, only the courts have jurisdiction to determine whether a particular form of expression is constitutionally protected. In that case, the US Post Office excluded as "non-enviable" certain allegedly obscene magazines. 5 In a six to one decision, the Supreme Court blocked the Post Office's decision. The decision is based on the determination that the post office had no authority to exclude those materials. Otherwise, the judges concluded that there could be a much more The institutional characteristics of the American judicial system, then, are indispensable in order to guarantee constitutional protections. 8 The wide range of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the courts, together with the existence of life-term judges and the relative isolation with which they live, means, as Professor Hart noted that "the structure of American institutions" predestined the courts to "be a voice of reason in charge of developing impersonal and durable principles..." 9 Professor Bickel added: "Judges have, or should have, leisure, training, and isolation to follow the path of the scholar to pursue the objectives of government. This 4 70 U.S. 478 (1962) 6 370 U.S. at 497-98. 7 Mr. Justice Brennan's suggestion that the first amendment itself demanded a judicial determination of whether speech was protected avoided the problems that have plagued earlier judicial efforts to establish a doctrine. Mr. Justice Brennan wisely avoided any reliance upon this line of authority. Moreover, the First Amendment basis for the position of Mr. Justice Brennan means that procedural rules growing out of the doctrine will be directly responsive to the First Amendment interests which the rule is designed to protect. It is, however, interesting to note that in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 n.6 (1964), Mr. Justice Brennan referred to Crowell as supporting broad appellate review.
8 " [T] he constitutional courts of this country are the acknowledged architects and guarantors of the integrity of the legal system. I use integrity here in its specific sense of unity and coherence and in its more general sense of the effectuation of the values upon which this unity and coherence are built." JAFFE, supra note 13, at 589-90. 9 HART, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term -Foreword, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959) . is necessary to solve the enduring values of society and is not something that institutions can easily do, so long as they operate from different parameters." the Supreme Court had to determine the constitutionality of a Maryland state law that required a film company to exhibit its films before an administrative body prior to its exhibition. If the commission disapproved of the film, the burden of proof for free speech laid on the exhibitor. The Supreme Court ruled for Freedman, although it did not affirm a right to exhibit obscenity. Simply put, the court established the due process guarantees to determine what is permissible and when to censor.
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The preference made patent in Freedman for judicial evaluation rests on more fundamental considerations -the inherent and institutional difference between courts and public administrative agencies.. First, life-term judges and, in the majority of cases, free of direct political pressures,
as opposed to what happens in Spain in its Constitutional Court. Second, the relative isolation of judges allows judges to be more impartial in their sentencing. In contrast, administrative bodies are generally political arms. Moreover, the role of an administrator is not that of an impartial judge but rather, an expert -a role that, logically, supposes narrower views and restricted criteria. This could be very dangerous in cases of obscenity: those who are constantly exposed to the perverse and obscene in literature quickly find obscenity in all that they see.
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But this institutional tunnel vision is not limited to censors. A committee, for example, when dealing with a free speech question, with all probability will tend to, see 10 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 25-26 (1962 problems in exclusively corporate terms and not within the terms of the Constitution.
The courts do not suffer from this myopia because their general jurisdiction gives them a wide perspective that no agency can have. By dealing with many varied questions on a daily basis, it is not likely that they will suffer from the deficiencies of an excessively narrow approach.
Following what has been said, there are further implications in other areas of law.
There is nothing in the logic of Freedman and his background to suggest that the principles put forth in this decision is limited to obscenity. In fact, when it comes to political expression, the need for a disinterested judicial process is even greater. It can then develop a hypothesis as a general principle of the First Amendment: no valid procedure is to protect freedom of expression in the hands of an administrative agency, regardless of the "justice" of the process. For example, in Freedman it seems clearly inadequate for state employees to fire or expel students outside a timely court order to take into account the interests of the First Amendment. When it comes to constitutional interests on freedom of expression under the First Amendment, it is doubtful that Congress could regain its former power to punish contempt of authority without a court order.
14 Already in the field of restrictions on freedom of expression, some considerations are appropriate with regard to the institution of the jury in American law. For a long time, it is true that this institution has been hailed as a major guarantor of individual freedom, including freedom of expression.
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English history and its relevance in colonial British America contain outstanding examples of the refusal of the jury at the time to punish speech critical of the government. But, it must be remembered that freedom of expression in the original concept reflected conflicts between a fairly homogeneous citizenry against the weight of an undemocratic and unrepresentative government and, as such, freedom of speech was conceived of as a way of giving power to "the voice of the people" and their right to be heard so that the representative government would be 14 Congress has an implied power to imprison, for the session of Congress, non-members who refuse to respond to its summons and give testimony. Anderson v. Dunn, I9 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). Since I857, however, the general procedure of the Congress has been to prosecute recalcitrant witnesses for misdemeanors under 2 U.S. C. 192, 194 (1964 Spain's transition to democracy, has been praised for its generous Bill of Rights and for the strong mechanisms included to protect them. 16 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 42, at 131-32. 17 The express articulation of these goals has, however, been of very recent origin. The First Amendment is today generally understood to protect and encourage criticism of government policy, "[f]or speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana ,379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) . This protection makes possible "the distinctive contribution of a minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 4I5, 431 (I963). For the view that the Court's "role" in our constitutional scheme is to protect "under-represented" minority groups through a vigorous application of the First Amendment, see M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 34-39 (I966). See generally, Brennan, supra note 39, at 14-I8. But the intention of the framers of the Constitution on the scope of the First Amendment is by no means clear.
Freedom of speech is one of the most classic and cherished rights within the Spanish Constitution.
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To that end, the rather extensive and complex Article 20, found in First Section, Title I, Chapter 2 of Spain's Constitution, recognizes the "right to express and freely disseminate thoughts, ideas and opinions through spoken word, text or any other means of communication," it also recognizes the "literary, artistic, scientific and technical production," as well as "academic freedom," and to "communicate or freely receive verifiable information from the press." Following that, the constitution states that "the exercise of these rights cannot be restricted by any previous form of censorship." It is worth noting that the legal benefit of this dual liberty-free expression and freedom of information is not only in the interests of a particular, but is also necessary for the existence of public opinion, essential in a democratic society, 21 and at the same time, the right is linked in a special way to the dignity of the person (art. 10.1 SC), by which the right is for all people against the government and against individuals, "especially when it collides with other fundamental rights (honor, privacy, freedom of enterprise, etc.)." In any case, we must reiterate that it is not easy to differentiate both freedoms, to the point that the Constitutional Court in various judgments has provoked confusion and inconsistencies when trying to separate them. The solution is to consider it a single right that encompasses two interdependent concepts.
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The Spanish Constitutional Court has never defined exactly what is and is not freedom of expression, which suggests that the wording of Article 20 defines the concept with sufficient eloquence. This lack of review by the CC allows broader interpretations of free speech and prevents narrow constrictions.
In its fourth paragraph, Article 20 imposes limits on the exercise of this freedom, limits based "on respect for the rights recognized in this Part, by the precepts of the Law for its implementation and, especially, the right to honor , to privacy, to self-image and the protection of youth and childhood." It will be noted below that these estimates must be qualified and have been subject to criminal and civil development. The recognition of freedom of expression carries a guarantee of its effective exercise and enjoyment through numerous protective mechanisms, characteristic of the rights enshrined in the Constitution. These guarantees are divided into judicial and legal systems.
As regards the former, public authorities are subject to the Constitution (art. 9.1 SC) and must not only respect but also "promote the conditions for freedom and equality of individuals and the groups to which they belong so that they are real and effective, to remove obstacles which prevent or hinder their application and facilitate the participation of all citizens in political, cultural and economic life." (art. 9.2 SC). In consequence, and since the Constitution is the supreme law --hierarchically superior to 28 For an extensive discussion, see F. SANTAOLALLA LÓPEZ, "Jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional sobre la libertad de expresión: una valoración", Revista de administración publica, núm. 31 The reinforced law is articulated by the organic laws for regulating the content of Section I, Chapter I, Title I of the Spanish Constitution, from hereon SC. The specialty of this type of law is that any adoption, amendment or repeal must be approved by an absolute congressional majority as stipulated in Article 81.2 SC. 32 The Constitution establishes here an special procedural mechanism for reform in Article 168. Due to its complexity, this has never been carried out. 33 The highest court in the land affirms that this balancing between two fundamental rights had not been determined by the lower court judge.
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In this way, it notes that the judge did not appreciate the concurrence in animus injuriandi that the journalist has, nor did the judge take into account the irrelevancy of the role of political criticism in the article against possibly humiliating or disrespectful ends..., all of which would had justified the earlier sentence of culpability. But he did not take into consideration the fundamental right allegedly infringed by the defendant. The CC states that it is not sufficient to apply and interpret the Criminal Code by itself, "without taking into account the constitutional protection of free speech found in Article 20, which was completely ignored."
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As a result of this omission, the CC concluded that the judge, by circumventing Article 20, damaged it. It thereby annuls his decision and grants free speech protection to the appellant journalist.
In the US, the case Manual Enterprises v. Day, mentioned above, is instructive with regard to the interests and actors involved in the freedom of expression. In April 1960, postal officials determined that three magazines, Manual, Grecian Guild Pictorial and Trim, were not "shippable" in the mail, according to federal law 18 USC 1461, because the magazines were "obscene" and because they conveyed information about where and how to get the obscene material. Accordingly, copies of the journals were kept by the post. Soon after, the owners of the journals held an administrative process between the post and those affected. Finally, the Supreme Court gave them the protections offered by the First Amendment declaring that homosexual and pornographic magazines are not "obscene."
The Supreme Court decided that even if these images strike a prurient interest among homosexuals, that they were not obscene as defined obscenity was defined in The CC clarifies that this is a case concerning the limits of the right to report truthfully and review its doctrine on the subject.
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The High Court declares that the rights enshrined in the Spanish Constitution are not absolute, "but that the limits imposed are also not absolute [...] ." 53 Thus, the court establishes criteria to be able to make an appropriate determination: the wide range of freedoms of expression and information, even greater if the exercise thereof "relates to substances that contribute to the formation of a free public opinion, as a guarantee of democratic pluralism," with a protection that is highest when freedom is exercised by professional journalists.
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In line with its gloss on the right to information, it determined that truthful information is "verified information by the standards of journalistic professionalism, excluding snares or mere rumors." The error is acceptable within the accuracy requirement.
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In this case, there is a discussion about facts that are surely to arouse public interest. The CC decided to declare unconstitutional and void the inclusion of the phrase "deny or" in the first paragraph of Article 607.2 of the Penal Code and otherwise leaves the rest of the exceptions, interpreted in terms of Legal Basis or Judicial Foundation 9.
In the U.S., the problem of hate speech has been resolved with more tolerance and without so many limitations. The only thing not permitted is what is known as "fighting words" or words that threaten a specific person.
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Conclusions
The first and most rapid conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that both in Spanish and American law, the degree of protection that is linked to freedom of expression is really wide.
However, it is logical that in Spain, free speech jurisprudence has had a shorter run, because during the dictatorship of General Franco it was restricted and there was a significant and active censorship. Only since 1978, Spain, ruled by a democratic Constitution, began to recover or even fully recognize civil liberties. So, there has been less development of this freedom in the Spanish case comparable to the US Supreme Court.
That said, both systems recognize certain barriers to freedom of expression. Such barriers can be sharp, as in cases of abuse, or both, as in cases of hate speech. Either way, the courts have to draw the limits very carefully, balancing the interests at stake and without losing sight of the Constitution. Neither rights nor limits to them are, of course,absolute.
Nor is there anything that is static and immutable, hence the importance of the role of "Until we write about government, religion, politics, and other institutions, I am free to write anything," said the French poet and playwright Pierre Augustin Beaumarchais.
Well, not anymore. Party political control is inseparable from criticism of powers.
In the U.S., case law will continue the constructions as outlined here and face crossborder cases. All of this suggests cases well worth studying. In Spain, the challenge will 
